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The Egyptian Question in Roman
Politics (65-30 B.C.)
William Henry Furness Altman
ABSTRACT 
Often presented as inevitable, the fall of the Roman Republic is
better understood in relation to the defeat of the republican
solution to Egyptian Question: the annexation resisted by the
Senate but achieved by Augustus in 30 B.C. was the result of a
process to achieve dominatio (Tacitus, Annals, 2.59) that began in 65
with M. Licinius Crassus. Because Herman Strasburger, Ronald
Syme, and Erich S. Gruen have made it more difficult to
appreciate the significance of this terminus a quo by attacking the
evidence of Plutarch, Suetonius, and Cicero, their work receives
critical attention. 
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srael Shatzman set the precedent by drawing much-needed
attention to the significance of the Egyptian Question in
late Republican Rome while restricting his investigation to
the 50s.1 Given the wealth of information about these
years, this restriction is understandable but now proves to be
inadequate.2 Even within Shatzman’s parameters, important
work has been done since 1971; in particular, Mary Siani-
Davies’s magisterial “Introduction” to her edition of Cicero’s
Pro Rabirio Postumo deserves mention in the Anglophone
context.3 Unlike Siani-Davies, Shatzman did not consider several
German doctoral dissertations written before 1971;4 naturally
other German contributions to the field have been made since
that time. It should be emphasized, however, that any limitations
of Shatzman’s bibliography are of no great consequence in
comparison with his crucial breakthrough: the identification of “the
Egyptian Question in Roman Politics.” And the principal limitation that
is relevant here is chronological: my purpose is to suggest why an adequate
understanding of the Question requires revising both of Shatzman’s
termini.5
A good place to begin this revision is with a passage from
Cicero’s second speech Contra Rullum of 63 B.C., our best source for
seeing the Question as a dilemma, i.e., as a problem with two distinct
solutions. Cicero undertakes to restage for the People a debate about
Egypt held in the Senate; he professes neutrality,6 and emphasizes the
difficulty of restaging the debate.7 He states the first position as a
spectacle that he sees before his eyes but the object of vision is blurry; its
proponent is unnamed:
I see someone who asserts that the will was made [Video qui
testamentum8 factum esse confirmet]; I am aware [sentio] that a
decree of the senate exists stating that it entered upon the
inheritance at the time when, after the death of Alexas, we
sent commissioners to Tyre to recover for our people a sum
of money deposited there by him.9
Although Cicero, speaking in 63, is using the present tense, he is
referring to an event that took place two years before in 65:10 the
occasion of his lost speech De Rege Alexandrino.11 Without mentioning
now that it was M. Licinius Crassus who made the case that provoked
5
I
William Altman | The Egyptian Question in Roman Politics (65-30 B.C.)
that speech, and who therefore is this unnamed qui, Cicero recalls the
support offered to this position by a distinguished consular:
I remember that Lucius Philippus frequently confirmed these
things in the Senate: “I see a consensus among almost
everyone [inter omnes fere video convenere] that he who holds that
kingdom at this time is kingly neither by birth nor in spirit.”12
Here, then, is the famous Piper: the protagonist of the Question
as it appears within Shatzman’s parameters, the buffoon about whom
there had long been almost no debate. 
But the important part of Cicero’s restaging in Contra Rullum has
yet to be heard. He continues:
On the other hand it is said [dicitur contra] that there is no will,
that the Roman people ought not [non oportere] to show itself
[videri] so eager to seize all the kingdoms upon earth; that our
citizens are likely to leave Rome and emigrate to that country,
attracted by the fertility of the land and its abundant supplies
of everything [propter agrorum bonitatem et omnium rerum copiam].13
Here, finally, is the real protagonist of the Question: Egypt itself,
the bounteous land of the Nile, with its civilization-spawning fertility
(bonitas) and its limitless wealth (omnium rerum copia).14 But first there is the
question of staging: Cicero is here stating the other side of the Question
(dicitur contra), summarizing what he had said against he who (qui) had
proposed (in 65 B.C.) the annexation of Egypt in accordance with the
will.15 And just as Cicero does not name his antagonist, he refuses
likewise to name himself: this passage should be recognized as an
invaluable testimonium to the lost De Rege Alexandrino.16 Having warned his
audience that it is a big question not only to decide but to describe, he
summarizes, as briefly as possible, the argument he himself had made: (1)
there is no authentic will, i.e., Rome has no legitimate right to Egypt and
(2) annexing Egypt is bad policy because (a) it will make Rome seem too
greedy and (b) it will lead to emigration.17 In her splendid commentary
on the fragments of this lost speech, Jane W. Crawford argues that an
attack on avarice was the central theme of De Rege Alexandrino;18 the
central item in Cicero’s summary (2a) confirms this view. More
importantly, Cicero’s summary shows that the Question in 65 was not
simply about the legitimacy of the testamentum but rather about the
6
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wisdom of annexing Egypt. And it is this way of framing the issue that
makes 30 B.C. the only natural terminus ad quem for an adequate
understanding of the true significance of the Egyptian Question in
Roman Politics: I added Egypt to the empire of the Roman People
[Aegyptum imperio populi Romani adieci].19
With these simple words, the adopted son of C. Julius Caesar
announced the final solution of the Egyptian Question. The important
point to make about this terminus ad quemis that it was by no means a
republican solution: the new province of Egypt did not become the
possession of the Roman People20 but rather the personal property of
divus Augustus,21 and then of the monarchs who succeeded him, absentee
Pharaohs of the land of the Nile. We know this because Tacitus
describes how Germanicus, during the reign of Tiberius, visited
Alexandria:
Without the emperor’s leave, contrary to the regulations of
Augustus. That prince, among other secrets of imperial policy
[dominationis arcana], had forbidden senators and Roman
knights of the higher rank to enter Egypt except by
permission, and he had specially reserved the country, from a
fear that anyone who held a province containing the key of
the land and of the sea, with ever so small a force against the
mightiest army, might distress Italy by famine.22
An awareness of the course, scope, and importance of the
Egyptian Question in the thirty-five years before the future “Augustus”
marched into Alexandria on what was then still called “the Kalends of
Sextilis” (August 1, 30 B.C.)23 provides an important clue to this well-kept
domitionis arcanum:24 the man who controlled Egypt would master Rome. 
To use the words of the Declaration of Independence, the
annexation of Egypt on these terms was made possible by “a long train
of abuses and usurpations” including but not limited to Rubicon,
Pharsalus, Pompey’s death, the Second Triumvirate (hence Cicero’s
murder), Philippi, Actium, and, by no means the least important, the
assault on Egypt from the West,25 through the scorching deserts of
Libya, conducted by C. Cornelius Gallus, first governor of Roman Egypt
and the first master of Latin Love Elegy. Perhaps Gallus’s twin
distinctions are as inseparable as the two parts of an elegiac couplet: at
the very least, the condition for the possibility of the imperial annexation
of Egypt was a state of affairs any republican would mourn, based as it
7
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was on the extinction of the Republic. The preservation of republican
forms or substance under the Empire is not at present the question.26
But once the Egyptian Question is understood as a debate about the
annexation of Egypt, the next step is to recognize that the historical
resolution of that debate in 30 constituted the victory of the side that
Cicero had already opposed in 65. In short: the republican solution to
the Question was and remained not to annex Egypt.
Beginning with Hegel’s lectures on The Philosophy of History, it has
become a commonplace to assume, tacitly or no, that the fall of the
Roman Republic was inevitable and rational;27 so commonplace is this
view that it would require a first-rate historian of ideas to record all the
variations on the theme: “A government intended to rule an Italian city-
state was inadequate for administering a world empire.”28 Perhaps the
truth is less grandiose: the Republic could not annex Egypt because any
Roman who controlled it would ipso facto master Rome. To begin with,
this understanding of the Augustan arcanum avoids any speculative theory
of historical determinism: it was not inevitable that Rome would annex
Egypt. Consider the phrase “dominationis arcanum” in a double aspect: it
was not only the emperor’s imperial secret but also the secret of his empire,
i.e., the empire’s secret basis. No doubt there were other imperial secrets
(Tacitus uses arcana) but it would be hard to imagine a more tangible one
than the wealth of the Nile, its omnium rerum copia. Augustus could not
have transformed Rome from brick to marble without Egypt.29 And an
awareness of the power Egypt conferred is useful not only because it
suggests the correct interpretation of Aeneid 1.286-96:30 a second
doubling of this arcanum, this one based on a chronological distinction,
sheds a new light on the fall of the Republic. 
Here’s the point: there is no good reason to think that this
particular domination sarcanum was discovered only after the annexation of
Egypt. Even after 30, the secret was not simply that control of Egypt
conferred; that is, had already conferred, power to Augustus, but rather
that it would confer power on whosoever controlled it, and thus that
access to it by distinguished Romans must be carefully regulated. Here
then is a third sense of the words dominationis arcanum: Egypt was the
secret basis of gaining a lasting dominatio in Rome and thus whoever
sought dominatio must control Egypt. One advantage to configuring the
secret in these terms is that this was an arcanum of which the most acute
exponents of both positions in the debate over the Egyptian Question
might be equally aware: if those who sought something more than a
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localized and temporary imperium dreamed of Egypt, opponents of
annexation feared that the power Egypt would confer would destroy the
Republic. Both were correct. But the fall of the Republic was not
inevitable: the Republic was at risk because there were those who knew
that the Roman who ruled Egypt would rule Rome.
“Caesar, Pompey, and…Crassus”; it is in that order; and with
some reasonable facsimile of that hesitation; that the so-called “First
Triumvirate” is most often remembered. But a willingness to reconsider
late Republican history in the light of the terminus ad quem of the Egyptian
Question; and whatever differences there may be between Erich S.
Gruen31 and Sir Ronald Syme,32 they constitute a formidable phalanx
against every attempt to do anything of the kind; points the student back
to 65 B.C. as the Question’s terminus a quo: it was then that M. Licinius
Crassus began taking steps that indicate he had discovered the domination
sarcanum. It was to his first attempt to bring Egypt into the empire that
Cicero referred in 63:
But if Alexandria is aimed at, why not follow the same course
as that taken under the consulship of Lucius Cotta and Lucius
Torquatus? Why not openly [aperte] as before? why not make
for that country, just as then, frankly and straightforwardly
[derecto et palam]? or, Romans, have those who [ii qui] by a
direct route [per cursum rectum] haven’t been able to grasp a
kingdom [regnum] now decided that by foul mists and darkness
[taetris tenebris et caligine], they are about to arrive in
Alexandria?33
The simple fact, as Cicero clearly realized, is that caligo was now
required; thirty-five years of it were duly dispensed by those who ( ii qui)
had failed to reach Alexandria per cursum rectum. For the student, the
terminus a quo of 65 illuminates the tenebrae of 63. Others learned a
different lesson: the defeat of the direct route in 65, and the failure of the
indirect approach in 63, taught Crassus that even greater indirection was
required. 
Without Pompey, Cicero could not have defeated the indirect
approach of 63: the passage of Contra Rullum devoted to unveiling the
plot to grab Egypt is brief and merely suggestive; Cicero’s deconstruction
of the Agrarian Law as a veiled attack on Pompey is explicit and
pervasive. An awareness of the central role the Egyptian Question plays
in “the Roman Revolution”34 rearranges the broad structures of late
9
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republican historiography: the two central players now become Crassus
and Cicero, the first statesmen to learn this important domination sarcanum.
In 63, Cicero could use Pompey to defeat Crassus’s solution to the
Egyptian Question; even with an absent Pompey, the novus homo had
demonstrated the insight and eloquence necessary for accomplishing the
unthinkable: a contio had rejected a lex agraria on the advice of a consul
popularis.35 It is difficult, as ever,36 to say whether Crassus was primarily
motivated by his desire for increased power, his rivalry with Pompey, or
his determination to detach his rival from Cicero (the brains of the
outfit) in the run-up to the creation of “the First Triumvirate,” but his
comparatively well-documented interest in the Egyptian Question
suggests a way to reduce the three to one. If the Rullan bill of 65 was an
indirect route to Alexandria, the alliance with Pompey in 60 was even
less of a cursus rectus, and the initial agreement of the triumvirs to uphold,
for a price, the republican position on the Egyptian Question is indicated
by Caesar’s recognition of the Piper’s regnum in 59.37 What this suggests
to me is that Crassus had made a conscious decision to uphold temporarily
that position until, whether by weakening Pompey, isolating Cicero, or
both, he could try again by the direct route.
Had Pompey possessed the secret, it is unlikely that he would
have returned from the East before securing Egypt. When the Piper
invited Pompey to invade Egypt on the King’s behalf, he refused.38 Can
we imagine Crassus wasting such an opportunity? If it was not his strictly
discretionary guarantee to uphold Egyptian independence during his
Eastern campaign that explains the curious passage in Lucan’s Civil
War,39 Pompeius Magnus had indeed performed a great service for
Egypt, simply by not behaving like his Egypt-conquering predecessors
Alexander and Cyrus the Great.40 Unlike Augustus in 30, Pompey did
not return, armed and enriched, from Egypt in 62: he possessed neither
the dominationis arcanum nor the will to use it. In fact, the will to dominatio,
and the original discovery of its Egyptian Arcanum, are probably
inseparable, at least in the first instance;41 it was in Crassus, not in
Pompey, that the two first became one. The same pattern would
continue after Pompey’s return to Rome: when his ally Gabinius invaded
Egypt in 55, his purpose was to restore the Piper, i.e., to uphold the
republican solution, albeit in its currently bastardized form.42 But this
restoration indicates that Egypt played a larger part in the renegotiation
at Luca than it had in the original compact of 60, and the debate over the
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restoration of the Piper in 56 deserves some additional comment, falling,
as it does, in the midst of Shatzman’s chronological perimeters.
At first sight, these well-documented events brought the
Egyptian Question into the open; in fact, they concealed it.43 It is
because of Shatzman’s focus on 59-54 that even the astute scholar, he
who first recognized that the Question merited independent
consideration, thought it was about who would restore the Piper, not
about the wisdom of Roman annexation in general. Rome’s annexation
of Cyprus in 5844 is one of many contemporary indications pointing
toward the real issue, indeed it was the Piper’s willingness to see Egypt
partitioned by piecemeal annexation that led to his expulsion in the first
place, and thus his need to be restored.45 And whatever the merits of
attempts to establish the independent agency of Clodius,46 the fact that
Cicero’s enemy engineered the Cyprus annexation, shortly after having
secured the banishment of the man who had blocked the Rullan bill of
63, suggests the temporarily chastened form that the more radical
solution to the Question took in 58. As a general principle, it is only
when the chronological parameters are extended in both directions that
the obscure controversy of 56 can be seen in its true light. And on this
basis, the restoration of the Piper by Lentulus Spinther likewise indicates
the form that “the republican” solution to the Question took at that
time;47 corresponding to Clodius’s annexationist program of piecemeal
partition, the Piper’s restoration by the governor of Cilicia (which now
included Cyprus)48 was probably no closer to the pure republican
position than the tribune’s had been to its opposite.49 In any case, this
solution was thwarted.50 And it deserves mention that although the
oracle was used as a pretext to deny the commission to Spinther,51 the
gods nevertheless seem to have been on the side of the Republic:
entering Egypt “with a host”, for whatever purpose, at whatever time,
would indeed cause Rome “both pains and dangers.”52
The purpose of this paper is not, of course, to retell the
complicated story of the Egyptian Question in late republican Rome; no
article could accomplish anything of the kind. And that is the point:
there is a need for a detailed and thorough account of “the last
generation of the Roman Republic” that puts the Question at the center
of “the Roman Revolution.” Aside from drawing attention to the
importance of the Question in general, it is specifically the expansion of
Shatzman’s chronological limits for which I am arguing throughout, and
since the terminus ad quem is rather obvious, much of the rest of this paper
11
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will defend in more detail my terminus a quo. But before turning back to
65, a few additional remarks about the multiple meanings of Tacitus’s
domination sarcana are in order.
Thus far, three meanings of this golden phrase have been
introduced: the Egyptian arcanum is: (1) an imperial secret known only by
the emperors, (2) the secret basis of their dominatio, once again known
only by the emperors, and (3) the secret basis of establishing that dominatio,
discovered well before there were any emperors. Naturally it is this third
version that is relevant to the period before 30, and it is now necessary
to introduce a further distinction with respect to it. Having been
discovered, the next step was to act upon it. Within the wide array of
possible actions, two ways of applying the secret can be distinguished: (4)
a direct and (5) an indirect approach. Not surprisingly, it was the direct
approach that was discovered first, by Crassus in my version of events.
But although the change of Crassus’s policy between 65 and 63 might
suggest that he likewise discovered the indirect approach, I do not think
this is truly the case: Carrhae was the poisoned fruit of his enduring
commitment to (4). For Crassus, then, (3) and (4) were practically
indistinguishable: he would get himself as close to Egyptas was practical at
the time. Thus it was only when (5) was discovered as alternative to (4)
that (4) ultimately became distinguishable from (3): a new version of the
secret had been discovered. Postponing for a moment the complicated
question of the first Caesar’s role, a clear title to this discovery belongs
only to the second.
Consider Antony, last obstacle to the theophany of Augustus.
Reaching Egypt first with Gabinius,53 Antony not only embodies (4) but
also illustrates, by antithesis, the power of (5). Although Antony’s defeat
required considerable effort and skill, there were already indications of
the bankruptcy of the direct route to Egypt. Postponing for now further
discussion of the early failures of 65 and 63, the following pattern is
remarkable: the losers in Rome’s final Civil War invariably head to the
East. The first to do so is Pompey: is the ultimate explanation of his
decision to abandon Italy in 49 to be found in his final flight to Egypt
after Pharsalus? Other explanations are, of course, at hand; likewise with
Brutus and Cassius. But when the same ruinous pattern reappears in
Antony, the thoughtful historian must pause and wonder why. I suggest
that the final form of the secret was that the only way to secure Egypt
was to appear not to wish to do so: it would be a political Columbus
who first discovered that the road to the East went west.  
12
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The transitional figure between Augustus and Crassus is, of
course, the first Julius Caesar; it was he who proved that the fastest route
to Alexandria led through Gaul. But did he really learn the secret of (5)?
His ruinous dalliance with Cleopatra suggests that he did not: Egypt
beckoned, and pulled ambitious Romans like a magnet.54 In this context,
Antony was following the examples of both Crassus and Caesar; not one
of the three had the winning combination. The core of the Egyptian
Question was, after all, the Roman annexation of Egypt. Wealthy as the
land of the Nile might be, it was only control of Egypt by a Roman qua
Roman that would make him supreme: hence Augustus’s final solution
to the Question. Of course the son could never have reached the goal
without the father. But it also seems that mastering the highest form of
the Egyptian domination sarcanum required the son to learn from the
failure of his father no less than from his success. Somewhere between
the success that crowned the elder Caesar’s brilliant discovery of the
western route to the East, and the mistakes he made after actually
reaching it, the second Caesar learned that Egypt must be loved as well
as hated, pursued relentlessly but no less resolutely shunned.55 Augustus
learned as much about the Egyptian Question from Caesar as Caesar had
learned from Crassus. 
It is only when we realize that seemingly disparate actions are in
fact “pursuing invariably the same object” that they can be configured as
“a long train of abuses and usurpations”; it is only on the basis of the
“absolute despotism” toward which it was relentlessly tending that the
train “evinces a design.” The Roman annexation of Egypt and the
despotism that eventually followed in its wake are indisputable historical
facts; the historiographical controversy arises from construing those facts
as the result of “design,” of men “invariably pursuing the same object.”
In the case of the Egyptian Question in late republican politics, there is
no need to speculate about the identity of these men or to manufacture
out of whole cloth the hypothesis of “design” in order to explain the
train’s ultimate destination: all that is necessary is to give the facts about
65 their due. Unfortunately, these facts came under attack in the
twentieth century. 
The salient facts are these: (1) Plutarch ascribes to Crassus as
Censor (in 65) “the dangerous and violent policy of making Egypt
tributary to Rome,” Several passages from this speech have already been
quoted; the following contains Cicero’s clearest reference to Crassus and
13
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Caesar, usually taken to refer to the former’s greed and the spendthrift
ways of the latter:56
Entrust then now, O Romans, all these powers to these men
whom you suspect of sniffing after the decemvirate; you will
find some of them who never think they have enough to keep
[ad habendum], and others who never think they have enough
to squander [ad consumendum].57
CICERO, CONTRA RULLAM II, 65 (FREESE)
It is telling, for example, that the missing opening of Cicero’s
first speech Contra Rullum was evidently devoted to the annexation effort
of 65.
Having listed the relevant passages and cited some of the
relevant German scholarship in n. 59, it is now useful to consider a
revealing but representative Anglophone treatment of the
aforementioned facts:
In 65 a graver peril [sc. to Egypt] threatened. The influential
Marcus Crassus in the year of his censorship attempted to
revive the testament of Alexander, and a tribunician bill was
promoted that may have proposed the annexation of Egypt.
But the ambiguities of Cicero in his brief surviving references
to the affair once more render the details of the business
uncertain. Possibly no more was intended than a specious
sequestration of the treasures of the Ptolemies under specious
pretexts. The sponsors made much of the illegitimate status
of Auletes, and drew analogies between his supposed murder
of Alexander II and the crimes of the former Numidian
usurper Jugurtha.58 The bill was defeated by conservative
forces, and no more is heard of schemes for the annexation
of Egypt in the Republic.59
Noteworthy features in this passage include (1) the obfuscation
introduced by “may have proposed,” (2) the use of Cicero to justify
uncertainty, (3) the speculative introduction of a benign purpose for the
proposed bill,60 and (4) the suggestion that interest in annexation
disappeared after 65.  But most striking of allis the fact that (5) Caesar’s
name does not appear in the passage despite the fact that the only
evidence of a tribunician bill is specifically linked to Caesar, not Crassus.
14
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And this last point is revealing: the twentieth century critique of the facts
that establish my terminus a quo, —and “the long train” that follows it
only “evinces a design” once “the same object” it was “invariably
pursuing” is recognized,61— is best understood as a refined form of
Caesarian apologetic that modifies (while preserving) a nineteenth
century critique of Cicero.
The unrefined form of that apologetic and critique is found in
Theodor Mommsen. Despite being a resolute and influential enemy of
the “Achselträger,”62 Mommsen inadvertently defended Cicero’s position;
— i.e., his opposition to Crassus and Caesar on the Egyptian Question
in 65 and 63,— by making a refreshingly strong case for the kind of
foresighted Caesar that Caesar’s twentieth century defenders of have
found it advisable to suppress.
Writing at the dawn of German enthusiasm for a simultaneously
patriotic and self-aggrandizing conception of Realpolitik, Mommsen does
not blush to ascribe such projects to his hero Caesar. 
Perhaps because of Germany’s defeat in the First World War,
perhaps because of subsequent developments, a new form of Caesarian
apologetic appeared on the scene in 1938 with the publication of
Hermann Strasburger’s Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte.63 Having already
destroyed the notion that there were“democratic” or “conservative”
parties in Rome, Strasburger here took the critical axe not only to the
“first conspiracy of Catiline” and “Caesar’s Egyptian escapade”64 but to
every detail of Caesar’s early life that could be used by republicans to
configure his career as “a long train of abuses and usurpations.”
Thanks to Ronald Syme, and perhaps also because Strasburger
was a Mischling tainted by “Jewish blood,”65Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte
became more influential among “the English-speaking peoples” than in
his native Germany. Syme’s portrait of Caesar as a resolute defender of
his own dignitas in The Roman Revolution (1939) depended explicitly on
Strasburger’s pioneering work.66And first in his review of Matthias
Gelzer (1944),67 then in his Sallust(1964),68 Syme explicitly rejected
Caesar’s involvement in the Egyptian annexation scheme of 65. This
rejection was accepted and embraced by Erich S. Gruen who, building
on what Strasburger had already done with Plutarch and Suetonius, took
his critical axe to Cicero’s Contra Rullum in The Last Generation of the
Roman Republic (1974):69 the tribune’s far-sighted piece of legislation did
not aim at annexing Egypt,70 it was not intended to weaken Pompey,71
and neither Caesar nor Crassus stood behind it.72 Most importantly, the
15
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confluence of Mommsen’s animus toward Cicero, Strasburger’s
whitewashing of Caesar’s early career, and Syme’s comprehensive vision
is visible in Gruen’s “Introduction”:
Caesar’s dramatic triumph casts antecedents in the shade.
Hence earlier events have become precursors and
determinants of that denouement—a dangerous fallacy. And
perspective can lead us astray in another direction.
Information on the late Republic rests heavily on the
pronouncements of Cicero. A figure of no small significance,
he looms even larger through the survival of his voluminous
writings. But Cicero’s attitudes grew out of personal—and
atypical—experiences. One cannot understand the history of
the late Republic as an extension of Cicero’s biography or as
an evolving blueprint for Caesar’s dictatorship.73
But what of Crassus?74 To be sure, “the coupling of Crassus
with Caesar was the work of propagandists in the 50s and later,”75 but
already in Strasburger,76 then in Syme,77 and finally as reflected in the
passage from Sherwin-White quoted at length above, there is a
noteworthy tendency “to throw Crassus under the bus,” i.e., to reject
only Caesar’s involvement in the plan to annex Egypt, and leave Crassus
“holding the bag.”78 But Gruen goes considerably farther than his
predecessors, and “bites the bullet” even in the case of Crassus:
Crassus in 65 advocated the annexation of Egypt, an issue of
high controversy and debate. A long line of historians
interprets the maneuver as an effort of Crassus (and Caesar)
‘to obtain a position of strength from which they could
bargain with (Pompey)’.79 Hidden aims and postulated
purposes, however, can be set aside. The proposal reached for
the revenues of Egypt; taxes from the land would bring rich
dividends to Roman coffers. Egypt was Rome’s by bequest,
so proponents of the bill urged. Crassus openly argued for
military action, if it should be necessary. This measure, like
that on the Transpadani, failed of achievement.80 But Crassus
had taken a firm stand as champion of Roman imperialism
and the Roman treasury.81
But not, it would seem, as champion of M. Licinius Crassus!82
And this is not the most revealing passage from Gruen’s review of Allen
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Ward’s Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (1977),83— still by far
the most valuable monograph on the subject,84— and another must
likewise be quoted at length (the page references are to Ward):
No more edifying is the persistent idea that Crassus operated
as a confederate of Julius Caesar. That interpretation pervades
a good portion of Ward’s book. Caesar acts with Crassus’
friends already in 70.85 The cash of Crassus advances Caesar’s
career.86 Then in the mid-60s the two men jointly hatch a
dozen schemes to harass Pompey and elevate their own
positions vis-à-vis the great general: they champion the
Transpadani, seek the annexation of Egypt, encourage various
consular candidates, sponsor agrarian legislation, collaborate
in the courts, and foster Catiline’s revolutionary aspirations in
order to precipitate a crisis from which they could benefit (pp.
128-192, passim).87 In Ward’s narrative, Crassus and Caesar are
virtually interchangeable, the actions of the one unhesitatingly
used to exemplify the policy of both. The whole
reconstruction relies on questionable evidence, a throwback
to an older theory long ago undermined by Strasburger.88
If I have dealt at considerable length with Gruen, Syme, and
Strasburger, it is because in combination they have managed to obscure
the significance of certain facts upon which the justification of my
proposed terminus a quo entirely depends. Influential though their
cumulative affect has undoubtedly been, not least of all in the United
States,89 there is still time for us to reconsider Roman History with the
same skepticism they so effectively applied to their predecessors.90 In
addition to Ward,91 it should be obvious from the notes that the writings
of Matthias Gelzer92 are of great value for freeing the events of 65 from
the caligo et taetrae tenebrae—, and it would be most unjust if Cicero’s spirit
did not return at the end,93— with which his student Strasburger
obscured them.94 Of course it is not only a question of 65: my purpose
throughout has been to show that joining 65 to 30 B.C.95 in relation to the
Egyptian Question opens up the way for a new approach to the fall of
the Roman Republic. After learning valuable lessons from Mommsen’s
open Caesarism, as well as from the Hegelian orientation on which it was
based,96there are several authorities, long since eclipsed by the rather
more covert Strasburger school,97 that deserve careful reconsideration,
foremost among them, L.G. Pocock.98 But the important thing is to keep
one’s eye on the prize: a twenty-first century account of the Republic’s
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fall that is worthy of our own republican traditions and future, an
account that does not present that fall as inevitable, but rather as the
result of a brilliantly conceived but continually evolving plan to defeat
the Republican Solution to the Egyptian Question. 
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RESUMO
A questão egipcia na politica romana (65-30 A.C.)
Muitas vezes apresentado como inevitavel, o declinio da
Republica romana pode ser compreendido melhor se colocado em
relacão com o fracasso da solucão republicana da assim chamada
questão egipcia. A anexacão do Egito não cumprida pelo Senado,
mas realizada por Augusto em 30 a.C., foi o resultado de um
processo que tinha como objetivo a dominatio (Tacito, Anais, 2.59) e
que foi comecado no ano 65 a.C. por M. Licinio Crasso. As obras
de Herman Strasburger, de Ronald Syme e de Erich S. Gruen
serão criticadas, uma vez que atacaram as evidências encontradas
em Plutarco, Suetônio e Cicero, dificultando dessa maneira a
apreciacão correta do significado desse terminus a quo.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Cicero; Contra Rullam; Marco Licinio Crasso; Augusto; Egito
romano; declinio da Republica romana.
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1 SHATZMAN, 1971, p. 363-369. It deserves mention, however, that he begins
with Cicero’s speech against Rullus (Contra Rullam 2, v. 41) in 63 B.C. (363) and
this important passage is quoted below. For an anticipation of his work, not
cited by Shatzman, see BOUCHÉ-LECLERQ, 1902, p. 241-265.
2 THOMPSON, 1994, p. 310-326. An indication of increased attention to the
Question is the addition of Dorothy J. Thompson, “Egypt, 146-31 B.C.” to J.A.
Crook, A. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds.). Cambridge Ancient History, volume 9,
second edition, p. 310-326 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
See also (in the same source), A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, 1994, p. 229-273, especially
271 ad fin.
3 SIANI-DAVIES, 2001. Her bibliography is indispensible.
4 BLOEDOW, 1963, p. 61-67; OLSHAUSEN, 1963, p. 45-63; HEINEN, 1966. 
5 HAVAS, 1977, p. 39-56. A useful account not cited by Siani-Davies, provides
support for my terminus a quo.
6Contra Rullam 2, v. 41: Hic ego consul populi Romani non modo nihil iudico, sed ne quid
sentiam quidem profero. This is a remarkably precise and accurate statement: Cicero
the man leaves no doubt that he has an opinion (quid sentiam) but that as Consul,
“I am not making a judgment; indeed I am not going to bring forth (profero)
what I think.” The prefix on the verb proferre is necessary because Cicero will
merely suggest what he thinks in 2.42 (see below).    
7Contra Rullam II2, v. 41: Magna enim mihi res non modo ad statuendum, sed etiam ad
dicendum videtur esse. While leaving the audience in no doubt as to the
momentousness of the decision to be made (magna res ad statuendum), Cicero
prepares them for the abbreviated, elliptic, and merely suggestive account of it
that he must give (ad dicendum). 
8 All subsequent students of the period are in debt to BADIAN, 1967, p. 178-192
for an adequate understanding of this testamentum.
9 The translation is that of FREESE, 1930. There is something to be said for
regarding “I am aware ... . . by him” as a quotation; the subject of sentio is, on
this reading, thw person who spoke these words originally, not Cicero now (see
below). Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 41.
10 Cf. Contra Rullam II2, v. 44: “But if Alexandria is aimed at [sc. in 63 B.C.], why
not follow the same course as that taken under the consulship of Lucius Cotta
and Lucius Torquatus [sc. in 65 B.C.]?” See Freese’s note (a) on 418 of Cicero VI:
“The reference is probably to Crassus, who, when censor in 65, had a design to
make Egypt tributary to the Romans, but was so vigorously opposed by his
colleague Catulus that both resigned.” Unfortunately, the caligo (Contra Rullam
II2, v. 44) that obscured the Question in 63 B.C. has scarcely lifted: taetrae tenebrae,
—primarily in the form of denying that Crassus (and Caesar) were behind
Rullus, —remains today. For an influential statement, see GRUEN, 1974, p. 389:
“Moderns have seen it as a plot of Crassus and Caesar. The conjecture is hasty
and ill-founded.” On which, more hereafter.  
11 See CRAWFORD; CICERO, 1994, p. 43-56. In defense of my terminus a quo,
consider 44: “The matter [sc. ‘annexing Egypt’] lay dormant, then, until the year
65, when M. Crassus undertook to reactivate this will.” A good account of this
dormancy is GRUEN, 1984, p. 672-719. 
12 2v. CICERO, Contra Rullam 2, v. 42.
13 “To seem” would be a better translation for videri. Naturally the same man
by whom it is said that there is no will is not the same man who said “I am aware”
that there is one; it therefore makes more sense to regard “auctoritatem... . . .
recuperarent” (2.41) as a quotation, on the model of Freese’s suggestion (see
previous note). CICERO, Contra Rullam 2, v. 42 (Freese).
14 Cf. SIANI-DAVIES, 2001. Pro Rabirio Postumo, p. 7: “By the time of Ptolemy
Auletes [sc. the Piper] Egypt remained a rich and potentially glittering prize,
with Alexandria still one of the foremost commercial centers of the
Mediterranean. The increasing frequency of business transactions between Italy
and Egypt and the official accounts of various embassies seemed to have excited
the imagination of the Romans and served to cultivate the image of Egypt as an
exotic country full of riches and, for those seeking it, a possible source of
political power.” I would liken Egypt to California in A.D. 1850 or, in a more
classical vein, to “the Golden Apple of Discord.”  
15 See SIANI-DAVIES, Pro Rabirio Postumo, 2001, p. 8-9,  on Crassus’s attempt in
65; she offers a succinct but useful summary of the 63 attempt on 9-10,
concluding with a useful corrective to Gruen (see n. 11 above): “Rullus’s
proposal was rejected, but, rather than being an isolated event, it should be seen
as part of the great power struggle then raging in Rome prior to Pompey’s
return. Had the proposal been accepted, then Crassus and Caesar would have
been able to bypass the Senate’s opposition to direct Roman intervention in
Egypt, and, in the process, put themselves in a position to counterbalance
Pompey’s political power.” 
16 A third edition of Crawford’s Fragmentary Speeches should include it under the
heading “Testimonia Incerta with Notes” p. 47-48. 
17 Note that this point, unlike the critique of avarice that applied to both
Senate and People, would be even more persuasive for senators; see GRUEN,
1974, p. 395: “The aristocracy was another matter. Their stance will have been
based on hard calculation, not readily swayed by Cicero’s grotesque
prognostications. Some may indeed have been sympathetic to a proposition that
would remove the poor to the land and offer other advantages to the economy.”
18 CRAWFORD, 1994, p. 55: “This is the culmination of the argumentation aimed
at persuading the senators [note that Cicero is addressing a contio in Contra
Rullam 2] to act honestly and without thought of personal gain in these
proceedings.” 
19 See BRUNT; MOORE, 1967, p. 32; cf. 71 (on 27.1): “The statement that Egypt
was brought under the power of the Roman people (30 B.C.) is also found in
other Augustan documents [citation deleted].” Res Gestae Divi Augusti 27.1.
20 The important point is made by SYME, 1939, p. 300. 
21 BRUNT; MOORE, 1967, p. 71: “Though Egypt was undoubtedly a province
[citation deleted], Augustus and his successors were regarded by the natives as
Pharaohs, and it was administered virtually as a private appanage of the
emperor”. See HERKLOTZ, 2007.
22 TACITUS, Annals, 2, v. 59.
23 HUZAR, 1988, p. 343-382, opening paragraph.
24 The secret vanishes in JÖRDENS, 2009, p. 36-41, climaxing with: “Dennoch
nahm Aegypten angesichts der allgemeinen Reisebeschrankungen für
Senatorenkeineswegs eine derart extreme Ausnahmestellung ein, wie es sich aus
dem Text des Tacituszu ergeben scheint.” 
25 See SIANI-DAVIES, 2001, p. 306-340. For a succinct but vivid account of the
difficulties facing an attack from the East (p. 331-332).
26 GRUEN, 1974, p. 497 (last word): “When Augustus emerged triumphant, he
was able to restore the veneer of the Republic; the substance was irrecoverable.”
27 HEGEL, 1956, p. 312-13., Beginning with: “The Republic could no longer
exist in Rome.” Incidentally, this is the passage (quoted below) to which Karl
Marx referred in the first sentence of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.
28 More insightful is BADIAN, 1968, p. 7: “It became clear to the Roman
governing class at an early stage that large increases of territory could not easily
be administered within the existing city-state constitution.” Cf. 43 and 59. 
29 1939, p. 304: “The beneficial working of the rich treasure from Egypt was
everywhere apparent.” For particulars, see “Milking the Cow: Taxes and Tax
Collection in Augustan Egypt” (123-155). In: CAPPONI, 2005, p. 123-155.
30 Following KRAAGGERUD, 1992, p. 103-112. The same misidentification has
plagued Gallus scholarship since ANDERSON;  PARSONS; NISBET, 1979, p. 125-155.
See MAZZARINO, 1980, p. 7-50; and the same author’s: Contributo alla lettura del
nuovo Gallus (JRS 1979, 157ss.) e alla storia della mima ‘Lycoris’. Helikon, p.
20-21,  (1980-81), p. 3-26.
31 GRUEN, 1974, p. 2: “An effort will be made to understand the Ciceronian era
in its own terms, without the categories imposed by retrospective judgment.”
32 Particularly with regard to C. Julius Caesar; see in particular SYME, 1939, p.
25. 
33 I have modified Freese’s translation. CICERO, Contra Rullam 2, v. 44.
34 Although well aware of Egypt’s importance, Syme has little to say about the
Egyptian Question in his classic before the memorable passage prompted by
Antony and Cleopatra (Roman Revolution, 260-261). Note the dexterity with
which he presents the imperial solution as a matter of course on 273, a sentence
which inadvertently supports my presentation of the Question: “Egypt was
clearly not suited to be converted into a Roman province: it must remain an ally
or an appanage of the ruler of Rome.”  
35 See AFZELIUS, 1940, p. 214-235.
36 GRUEN, 1974, p. 89: “The motives of Crassus are, as ever, obscure.”
37 See SIANI-DAVIES, 2001, p. 13; and SHATZMAN, 1971, p. 364-365.
38 Appian, Mith. 114 (translation Horace White): “But he did not advance into
Egypt, although the king of that country invited him there to suppress a
sedition, and sent gifts to himself and money and clothing for his whole army.
He either feared the greatness of this still prosperous kingdom, or wished to
guard against the envy of his enemies, or the warning voice of oracles, or for
other reasons which I will publish in my Egyptian history.” See also OLSHAUSEN,
1963, p. 35-36, ending with: “Doch bleiben alle Vermutungen, die zur
Erklarung, weshalb Pompeius jene Gelegenheit in Ägypten einzugreifen, dienen
sollen, aus Mangel an Quellenzeugnissen ungesichert.” What is certain from the
sources is that Pompey did not possess the dominationidomination sarcanum. 
39 Bellum Civile, v. 518-519; see CRAWFORD, 1994, p. 48.
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